Kosovo and Serbia may need more reasons or incentives to cooperate. Who could step-in?
There should be a broader debate about the role both state and non-state actors can play in advancing the normalisation talks between Kosovo and Serbia. The EU will, of course, still lead the formal negotiations, linking normalisation closely to the process of EU integration. In this context, other partners can help with implementation, promote cooperation, and maintain contacts when political discussions become difficult.
By Ramadan Ilazi
A more comprehensive approach would be for bodies which have different kinds of influence to take part. For instance, NATO could set up new kinds of cooperation with Kosovo, the Council of Europe could proceed with Kosovo’s application for membership, the UN could take the step of granting Kosovo observer status, Switzerland could continue to play its role of facilitating the unofficial contacts, and the United Arab Emirates could provide additional investment funds together with its contacts with both capitals and its practical experience of mediation. The objective in this case would be to prevent there from being competing mediators and instead to create a wider coalition of incentives around the EU-led process.
For Kosovo, the key issue is how the normalisation dialogue functions in practice. Whether progress is made, or not, in its relations with Serbia directly affects Kosovo’s ability to obtain further recognition and enhance its international standing. Similarly important is the effect of the dialogue on the relations between Kosovo’s Albanians and Kosovo’s Serbs within Kosovo.
That is why the progress made towards normalising relations between Kosovo and Serbia cannot be judged merely by the number of agreements arrived at in Brussels; it must also take into account whether they are put into effect, whether the arrangements function in practice, whether the communities have confidence in them and whether they have a positive impact on people’s day-to-day lives.
The Agreement on the Path to Normalisation, which was reached in February 2023, together with its Ohrid annex, are still the most important recent accomplishment between Kosovo and Serbia, at least in name. It includes Serbia’s commitment not to oppose Kosovo’s membership in international organisations, as well as provisions relating to Kosovo’s Serb community. More than three years on, neither party has completely carried out its obligations, with implementation still being the main issue.
Peter Sørensen, the EU’s special representative for the normalisation dialogue, appears to be advancing the process through a series of small, practical measures; the agreement reached in March 2026 on civil registration and the Law on Foreigners are suitable examples. This kind of work should receive support because it addresses specific problems and shows that accommodation is possible. The issue now is how these step-by-step actions can help to promote a wider political process.
The domestic situation in both Kosovo and Serbia offers little encouragement. Kosovo conducted its third parliamentary election in the last eighteen months in June, and Serbia will have its elections on 25 October. Because electoral campaigns make the normalisation dialogue an easy target for political attack, the circumstances become more difficult in which to make decisions or even to take part in the process. Yet elections cannot indefinitely be used as an excuse for failing to implement the commitments already made.
One aspect of the problem is the gap between what EU institutions are willing to suggest and what member states are prepared to back. As a result, the credibility of EU incentives has been diminished. The problem is particularly evident in the case of Kosovo, since the local government does not believe that advancing the Association of Serb-majority municipalities will result in candidate status or another significant step toward integration. The domestic political cost is obvious, though the reward isn’t.
The situation now resembles a staring match. The EU maintains that it cannot reach agreement among the five member states which do not recognise Kosovo unless it has clearer evidence of Kosovo’s commitment to the dialogue, multi-ethnicity and the rights of the Kosovo Serb community. Kosovo’s government is unwilling to take any steps Brussels would consider constructive because it does not believe the EU could offer anything substantial in return. Yet, at civil society meetings in Brussels, representatives from some non-recognising states said they could back progress for Kosovo if the government proceeded with the Association. This shows there is scope for progress, but the EU would still have to turn it into a credible proposal.
The situation in Kosovo is arguably riskier than that in Serbia. Since Kosovo it is not a member of NATO and still lacks recognition from five EU member states, Kosovo has not finished its process of international integration. An adverse political environment in some of the major European countries might make further advances more difficult. The EU therefore needs to establish a credible series of incentives for Kosovo, while Kosovo’s government should aim to achieve practical objectives such as gaining candidate status, improving its relations with NATO, and making progress towards membership of the Council of Europe.
Instead of looking for one big agreement, Kosovo and Serbia could be given what might be described as modular normalization, that is to say a coordinated set of measures in which different actors (both state and non-state) give separate but mutually supporting incentives. NATO could strengthen security assurances by offering Kosovo Partnership for Peace, accrediting a centre of excellence in the country, and initiating a bi-annual political dialogue. The Council of Europe based in Strasbourg could make membership a reality by giving Kosovars access to the European Court of Human Rights. States that are supportive at the United Nations and in other multilateral organisations could work toward obtaining non-member observer status and becoming members of UNESCO, the World Health Organisation, INTERPOL, and so on. No single mediator could promise all of these steps since each involves separate procedures, votes, and political coalitions; however, they could be arranged so that each verified commitment by Kosovo and Serbia is followed by a concrete action towards Kosovo’s international integration. The EU would continue to act as the official facilitator, while this broader coalition of incentives would help to make the implementation a politically viable option.
Useful experience also comes from channels available outside the realm of formal diplomacy. Switzerland has arranged exchanges between Serbian and Kosovar groups to generate ideas that might help advance the EU process. These Track II discussions can help to maintain relationships and examine practical possibilities during times of political uncertainty. Their value depends on whether the right people are involved and whether the ideas reach decision-makers. Other parties might be able to assist with this kind of work if they can provide additional resources or connections. A possibility worth looking at is the United Arab Emirates.
At a recent roundtable organised by KCSS at which I took part, the topic of the UAE’s involvement in the Western Balkans and its potential contribution to peacebuilding was discussed. The argument for considering such a role is based on its relationships with both Kosovo and Serbia, its ability to make investments, and its track record of helping to achieve some diplomatic results.
The United Arab Emirates recognised Kosovo in 2008 after having provided humanitarian aid and taking part in peacekeeping operations. Economic relations are still limited: bilateral non-oil trade amounted to approximately $16.2 million in the first six months of 2023. Engagement with Serbia, by contrast, is much greater. The UAE-Serbia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement was signed in October 2024 and came into effect on 1 June 2025. The agreement includes provisions relating to trade, services, investment, logistics, digital trade, small and medium-sized enterprises, and government procurement.
This enables Abu Dhabi to access both capitals, though access does not imply influence. Investment alone is unlikely to change Serbia’s stance on Kosovo. The issue in question is whether the UAE would be willing to link further opportunities to practical cooperation, in cooperation with the EU. The Cibuk 1 wind project, backed by Masdar, shows that Emirati investment can work alongside European and international financial institutions, as the EUR 300 million project secured a EUR 215 million financing package from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Finance Corporation.
The UAE’s experience in mediating negotiations offers more specific grounds for considering that possibility. By August 2026, 26 exchanges between Russia and Ukraine that were arranged by the UAE had resulted in the freeing of 7,997 prisoners on both sides. Moreover, in 2026 Abu Dhabi hosted two rounds of three-way talks involving Russia, Ukraine and the United States. Although the talks did not end the war, their occurrence shows that the UAE can serve as a channel acceptable to parties with strongly opposing views. There are other relevant examples. In April 2025, the UAE hosted and helped facilitate a prisoner exchange between the United States and Russia. In 2018, it supported the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea and later hosted their leaders at a trilateral summit in Abu Dhabi. These cases should not be overstated and of course the conflicts/disputes were different, and the parties themselves made the main political decisions. They do show, however, that the UAE’s interest in mediation has sometimes produced practical diplomatic outcomes.
In the case of Kosovo and Serbia, a reasonable first step would be to back independent Track II talks that address issues already covered in the current dialogue. Participants could examine obstacles to trade, professional exchanges, or access to services, then put forward suggestions to the EU facilitator. Furthermore, UAE funding could support civil society cooperation among different communities, such as by providing legal assistance, conducting joint research, and funding local initiatives that require continuity after individual projects end.
The matter also has an economic dimension. The UAE could fund research and offer investment opportunities in fields such as logistics or renewable energy, since collaboration would yield clear benefits for both parties. Negotiations at an unofficial level could be carried out to explore possibilities, with the governments and the appropriate institutions approving any commitments. Funding should be provided in accordance with the agreed implementation milestones, with coordination from Europe and transparent procurement procedures.
To secure wider support for the cooperation, the benefits must be passed on to local businesses and communities. It does not follow that a combination of incentives could replace the EU-led dialogue, since it would address one of the dialogue’s key weaknesses: the lack of confidence on both sides that fulfilling difficult commitments will lead to real benefits. In this context, well-defined contributions from other parties could help sustain cooperation and support implementation. The UAE’s possible role should be considered this way, evaluated not on political symbolism but on actual results. NATO, the Council of Europe, the EU, the UN member states that support the cause, and the members of organisations such as UNESCO and INTERPOL all have different things to offer, ranging from security guarantees and the protection of rights to economic cooperation and improved international access.
If these offerings were coordinated and tied to clear and verifiable actions on the part of both Kosovo and Serbia, normalisation would no longer depend mainly on the remote prospect of eventual EU membership but it would instead become a process in which advance makes visible benefits possible. The aim of such a coalition of incentives is not to increase the number of mediators, but to make the current mediation more credible and to make implementation more worthwhile. Kosovo and Serbia must achieve normalisation, and EU leadership is still essential, but other countries can help make the cooperation more beneficial and lasting.
In other words, this article explored, two closely linked ideas on which the main proposal of this article is based are modular normalisation and a coalition of incentives. Modular normalisation should shift the process away from reliance on a single grand bargain and towards a series of specific and verifiable steps, while a coalition of incentives would make these steps politically worthwhile by coordinating the various things that the EU, NATO, the Council of Europe, the supportive UN member states and partners such as the UAE are in a position to offer. The two concepts are interdependent: modular commitments need credible rewards, and international incentives require a common framework and clear conditions. Together, they could make normalisation more practical, make implementation more attractive and make ongoing obstruction more costly.
(Author is head of research at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS), and holds a PhD in politics and international relations).
Të rejat Lexo më shumë
Problemet teknike në rrjetin e trafikut ajror në Itali shkaktojnë vonesa dhe anulime fluturimesh
Musliu kërkon raportim nga drejtori i policisë dhe shefi i IPK-së për operacionin në protestë, Zyba kundërshton
Man City rrezikon përjashtimin deri në 10 vjet nga garat evropiane